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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE IAWYER'S
OBLIGATION TO THE LAW
JuIDiT A. McMoRuow*
Lawyers work with, under, for, and around the law as their professional
livelihood. Lawyers are called "officers of the court," "officers of the
law," and "ministers," and swear allegiance to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States.' Even the title "lawyer" reinforces the
relationship between the person and the law. The very nature of law binds
the lawyer to the content of law because, as every lawyer knows, the law
is not a series of set rules plucked from universal concepts of right and
good. Rather, law is an ongoing process that reflects shifting societal views. 2
This ever changing nature of the law forces lawyers to be active participants
in the shaping of law.3 Because the lawyer plays a significant role in the
shaping of law and benefits materially from and has special knowledge of
the law, scholars and aspirational codes assert strongly and persuasively
that the lawyer has special obligations both to uphold the law and to strive
to make the law just.4
* Associate Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. I would like to
thank Rosemary Globetti and Mark Grey for their invaluable research assistance and comments,
Denis J. Brion, David S. Caudill, Sam Calhoun, Gwen T. Handeliman, Steven Hobbs, Louis
Hodges, and Rick Kirgis for their helpful comments and advice,. and the Frances Lewis Law
Center of Washington and Lee University School of Law. I would also like to thank the
fifteen undergraduate students in Legal Ethics who provided thoughtful and vigorously pre-
sented perspectives on this complex topic.
1. C. WoLFRAM, MODEm LEGA.L ETmcs § 1.6 (1986) (discussing officers of the court),
§ 13.2.1 (discussing officers of the law), and §- 15.3 (discussing oath of office); ABA CANONs
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 32 (1908) ("[n]o client, corporate or individual, however
powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we
are .... "). States generally require an oath of office. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3903
(1988) ("[b]efore an attorney may practice in any court in the Commonwealth, he shall take
the oath of fidelity to the Commonwealth, stating that he will honestly demean himself in the
practice of law and execute his office of attorney-at-law to the best of his ability"). See
generally Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989) (arguing that
phrase "officer of the court" is "vacuous and unduly self-laudatory" and that lawyers should
"either stop using the officer of the court characterization or give meaning to it"). '"
2. Consequently, the law is constantly at tension with itself as society attempts to find
the appropriate balance between tradition (heritage) and change (heresy). See Brion, An Essay
on LULU, NIMBY, and The Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENvm. Ar'. L. Rv.
437, 439 (1988).
3. This phrasing is the product of Claire Horisk, Oxford University- exchange student
at Washington & Lee University. See also Phelps, No Place to Go, No Story to Tell: The
Missing Narratives of the Sanctuary Movement, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 123 (1991); Wilkins,
Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 468, 477 (1990) ("lawyers have more practical
power than judges to manipulate the legal terrain").
4. See, e.g., Gibson, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Profession, 31 SAsKATcHEWAN
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If indeed lawyers have two special obligations-to uphold the law and
to work to assure the law is just-then we understandably are confused
about whether a lawyer should engage in civil disobedience or should counsel
clients to engage in civil disobedience. 5 Civil disobedience is the public and
nonviolent violation of law for which the actor accepts punishment willingly. 6
Civil disobedience is a commonly accepted method of attempting to make
the law more just. If the lawyer's primary obligation is to take all necessary
steps to make the law just, then the lawyer would be free to engage in civil
disobedience or counsel clients to do so. If the lawyer's primary obligation
is to uphold the law, then the lawyer's ability to engage in civil disobedience
or counsel clients to do so might be reduced.7
The purpose of this essay is to propose and justify a theory of the
proper role of the lawyer faced with issues involving civil disobedience. I
begin with an initial assumption that in certain circumstances an individual,
including a lawyer as an individual, may feel morally compelled to engage
in acts of civil disobedience." The authors in this symposium have debated
the scope and extent of the use of civil disobedience, but no author has
BAR REv. 211, 219 (1966) (" [t]hat a person is a lawyer imposes on him an obligation to
uphold the authority and dignity of the law, but it also involves a duty to ensure that the law
remains just and adequate"); MODEL CODE OF PRorassioNAL REsPoNsmmrry Canon 8 (1981)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("[a] Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System") and
MODEL CODE EC 8-2 ("[i]f a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law,
substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by
lawful means to obtain appropriate change in the law"); MODEL RULEs OF PROFs.oNAL
CONDUCT 6.1 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RuLEs] ("[a] lawyer should render public interest legal
service ... by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal
profession") and Preamble ("[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice").
5. This article discusses the lawyer as counselor and does not address directly other
roles that a lawyer might play, such-as lawyer as judge, legislator, or law-enforcement officer.
The conclusions drawn in this article, however, obviously would affect the lawyer's role in
these other circumstances.
6. Civil disobedience writers have multiple definitions of civil disobedience. Indeed,
authors in this symposium reflect various shades of meaning when they discuss civil disobe-
dience. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 3, at 127 n.17 and accompanying text. In this article I
use civil disobedience to mean the public, nonviolent breaking of the law and the willing
acceptance of the punishment. Cf. J. RAWLs, A THEORY oF JusncE 364 (1971) (stating civil
disobedience is "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually
done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government").
Philosopher John Rawls distinguishes between civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. He
defines conscientious refusal as "noncompliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or
administrative order." Id. at 368.
7. Throughout this introduction the word "law" is used in its "generic sense" to refer
to the "rules of action or conduct duly prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding
legal force." United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34 (1930).
8. The assumption that civil disobedience is sometimes at least morally correct necessarily
includes the recognition that law and morality do not overlap completely. This is hardly a
startling conclusion. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAv.
L. REv. 593 (1958).
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asserted that civil disobedience is never appropriate. 9 If one believes civil
disobedience is wrong for everyone, then it is wrong for the lawyer, and
the question of the lawyer's responsibility is easy.'0
Given the assumption that civil disobedience sometimes is morally
proper, the more difficult question concerns whether civil disobedience might
be proper in certain circumstances for general (nonlawyer) citizens, yet still
improper for the lawyer, either as individual or as counselor. As described
in Part IA, by becoming a member of the legal profession the lawyer takes
on special responsibilities, which require the lawyer to make certain personal
and professional sacrifices. As described in Part IB, our American legal
system, with its Constitution, Bill of Rights, and emphasis on democracy,
causes many people to see a close correlation between the rule of law (the
notion that there are certain principles of justice with which both govern-
ments and individuals must comply) and positive law '(the pronouncements
of legislatures, courts, and administrative entities). Part IC sets out why,
in light of this close identification between positive law and the rule of law,
lawyers have a special obligation to act in accordance with the law. Because
lawyers are essential agents of the positive law and voluntarily enter into
that agency relationship, lawyers must recognize that legal professionals are
more identified with the positive law than general citizens. Consequently,
to protect the rule of law, lawyers have a special obligation to exercise
caution before engaging in civil disobedience." I conclude Part I with a
discussion of how the lawyer's special obligation should be manifest and
what role professional regulation should play in implementing this special
obligation.
Part II of this article discusses the lawyer as counselor. When serving
as a counselor, the lawyer provides both raw information and discussion to
help the client make a fully informed decision. The lawyer's role as counselor
includes informing the client of his or her options within the law. In order
to fulfill this responsibility the lawyer must be able to have a wide ranging
discussion with the client. Any limitations on the lawyer's discussion come
from according proper respect for the client's autonomy.
9. Nazi Germany provided us with a recent horrifying example of why positive law
should not be blindly followed in all circumstances. I find it personally troubling that the
Nazi regime assumed control of the German legal system with relative ease. Exploring whether
this takeover was made easier by the nature of lawyers is, unfortunately, a topic too far afield
to discuss here.
10. See, e.g., Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
205 (1966) (labeling civil disobedience as "heresy" and stating that "lawyers, of all people,
must retain a wholesome degree of rational detachment in the face of emotional causes"). As
discussed in the next section, lawyers occasionally are exempt from general obligations due to
some superseding duties to the client. If civil disobedience is wrong for everyone, I can think
of no special reason to exempt the lawyer from the general prohibition.
11. From my discussion with both lawyers and nonlawyers, I have learned that this
conclusion is believed by many individuals to be either obviously right or obviously wrong.
This was not the conclusion I thought I would draw when I began to explore this question.
As much as I may wish to deny it, as a lawyer I am part of the power structure.
1991]
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I. THm LAWYER ENGAGING IN CrVI DISOBEDIENCE
A. The Lawyer and Special Duties
If we decide that lawyers should never be held to different standards
than those standards imposed on the general public, then determining the
lawyer's role in civil disobedience is easy. Lawyers would be just like
everyone else: if a certain situation did not warrant an act of civil disobe-
dience by a general citizen, a lawyer would be wrong to commit an act of
civil disobedience; if a particular circumstance justified an act of civil
disobedience committed by a citizen, a lawyer also would be justified in
engaging in civil disobedience.
Attorneys, however, have been held to special standards. For example,
the attorney-client privilege can protect a lawyer from criminal sanctions
for failing to reveal known information even though a nonlawyer possessing
the same information might be criminally liable. 12 More commonly, the
lawyer may have affirmative obligations not applicable to general citizens.
For example, a lawyer may have a special duty to disclose lawyer wrong-
doing, 3 to rectify the consequences of having offered material evidence that
the lawyer later learns was false, 14 and to disclose known adverse legal
authority.' 5
Lawyers even give up some essential attributes of our free society when
representing a client. For example, under the provisions of professional
regulation a lawyer's right to comment on pending cases is limited.' 6 A
state may constituionally impose a character and fitness requirement on
persons seeking admission to the bar and may compel a bar applicant to
take an oath of office stating that the applicant believes in the form of
government in the United States and is loyal to the government, even if a
similar oath could not be demanded of general citizens.' 7 State bars may
12. See, e.g., People v. Beige, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aff'd, 41
N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976) (holding attorney client privilege shielded
lawyer from being charged with criminal violation of state statute requiring persons to report
unburied corpses); see also Levinson, To a Young Lawyer: Thoughts on Disobedience, 50 Mo.
L. REv. 483, 486 n.6 (1985).
13. MODEL CODE DR 1-103(A); MODEL RULES Rule 8.3(a).
14. MODEL RULEs Rule 3.3(a)(4) and comment (addressing false evidence and remedial
measures).
15. MODEL CODE DR 7-106(B)(1) and MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(3).
16. MODEL CODE DR 7-107(A) (limiting "extrajudicial statement[s] that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication"); MODEL RU.ES
Rule 3.6(a) (same). The lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client also requires that the lawyer not
publicly speak against a client's position while advocating that position in court. MODEL CODE
DR 7-101(A)(3) ("[a] lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage his client during the
course of the professional relationship .... "); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 106 Nev.
60, 787 P.2d 386 (1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 669 (1991).
17. Law Students Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 166 (1971)
(involving approved oath and finding that bar is entitled to make inquiry into associations
when applicant seeks membership "to a profession dedicated to the peaceful and reasoned
settlement of disputes between men, and between a man and his government"); see also C.
WoLFPA, supra note 1, at §§12.2.3, 15.3; C. WAwtEN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
(1911) (tracing use of English oath in American colonies).
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE LAWYER
also constitutionally exclude applicants who believe in the violent overthrow
of the government and have a specific intent to bring revolution about. 18
The dominant ethic of our adversary system, as well as a dominant
theme taught in law school, is that the lawyer should "represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law."' 19 This representational ethic
requires the lawyer to engage in what lias been called "role-differentiated
behavior."' 2 The extent to which lawyers should engage in role-differentiated
behavior is debatable, but I know of no legal theorists who argue that a
lawyer has no special obligations whatsoever. By accepting the role of
lawyer, the lawyer takes on additional responsibilities which, in turn, may
require that the lawyer give up certain freedom of action.21
Consequently, there is nothing conceptually startling about the idea that
a lawyer may have special obligations or limited rights as a lawyer, distinct
from or in addition to one's obligations or rights as a general citizen. The
difficulty lies in transforming the general notions about special obligations
into mandates for concrete responsibilities in practice. Given that a person
may feel compelled to engage in civil disobedience and given that in theory
18. Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 165-66. See C. WotsAm, supra note 1, at §§12.2.3 (discussing
freedom restrictions on lawyers) (cites other cases), 15.3 (discussing competence and character).
19. MODEL CODE Canon 7; MODEL Ruins Rule 1.3 comment ("[a] lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf").
20. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, -5 HuM. RTs. 1, 3 (1975).
This theme is sounded repeatedly in professional responsibility literature. See, e.g., Freedman,
Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U.L. Rha. 331, 333 (1987) (arguing that after
lawyer agrees to represent client, lawyer's autonomy is significantly limited "because the
lawyer's principal function is to serve the client's autonomy"); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976)
(stating that it is "morally right that a lawyer adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering
of [the] client's interests-that it is right that a professional put the interests of his client
above some idea, however valid, of the collective interest"); Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J.
613, ,614 (1986) (stating that "[o]nce a lawyer has entered into the professional relationship
with a client, the notion is that conduct by the lawyer in service to the client is judged by a
different moral standard than the same conduct by a layperson").
21. The idea of role-differentiated behavior pervades more than just the lawyer's role.
In all walks of our society, we willingly impose both legal and moral responsibilities because
of special relationships. For example, parents have special obligations to care for their children.
See H. .CLAR, THE LAw OF Doimmsc RELATIONS IN TE UNITED STATES § 6.2 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing parental duty to support children). The notion of special responsibility also pervades
the many justifications for engaging in civil disobedience. For example, in explaining why she
was defying a court order to allow her child to have unsupervised visits with the child's father,
Dr. Elizabeth Morgan referred to two special duties she felt were imposed upon her by her
special roles: "[I]t's my obligation to my daughter as her mother and also within my moral
obligation as a physician to take a stand to protect both my child and as a physician to see
that another human being does not come to a point of destruction." Address by Stephen H.
Sachs, Rule Day Club, Baltimore, Md. (March 12, 1990). Similarly, Professor McThenia
discusses how he felt that his position as a Christian in society imposed on him a certain
responsibility. McThenia, Civil Resistance or Holy Obedience? Reflections from Within a
Community of Resistance, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REy. 15 (1991).
1991]
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lawyers may have special obligations, we can now address the harder
question of what special obligations ought to be imposed on the lawyer.
B. Ideal of "Rule of Law"
Even assuming that civil disobedience is a morally appropriate method
for citizens to challenge unjust laws, a necessary predicate to effective civil
disobedience is a functioning legal and social system. We have in our
jurisprudence two closely related concepts that support our legal system.
First, most members of our society believe in the rule of law. The phrase
"rule of law" carries mythic connotations for most of us, including lawyers.
Functionally, the rule of law requires that both individuals and government
are subject to the same general rules of fair play. The rule of law encom-
passes ideas of fair administration, procedural due process, and (for some)
substantive fairness. 22 The rule of law, however, must be implemented. In
our legal system we implement the rule of law through a defined process
of democratic decisionmaking. We established a Constitution, including a
Bill of Rights, that establishes a democratic republic. This political system
was designed to be relatively close to the ideal of the rule of law in light
of our pluralistic society and flaws of human nature.
The result of this law making process is positive law-the legislation
produced by our legislative process and decisions by courts and administra-
tive entities. 23 The ideal of the rule of law-of fair administration, procedural
due process and certain just results-pervades our political myth and legal
22. See generally Caudill, The Rechtsstaat: Magic Wall or Material Necessity, 4 HOUSTON
J. INT'L L. 169 (1982); J. RAwis, supra note 6, at 235-43 (1971).
23. In order to justify the importance of lawyers adhering to law, we must justify the
idea of law itself, a topic that is far beyond the scope of this article. As a basic premise,
however, to justify law requires that we accept at least three foundation points. First, we must
accept that political authority is legitimate under certain circumstances. Second, we must agree
that there is a generalized duty to obey law issued by legitimate political authority. Finally,
we must agree that our United States legal system represents a legitimate political authority.
Philosophers have written for centuries justifying the legitimacy of political authority. Whether
we justify political authority to curb humankind's natural tendencies, as a method to enhance
virtue in citizens, or as part of a social contract, we know that as social beings we function
in political units. See, e.g., AnmTOTsE, PoLucs; J. Locan, OF CvI GovEtNmENT: THE
SacoD TREATISE (Ist published 1690); T. HOBBS, LaviArTA (1st published 1651) (when men
live without power to keep them in awe, war emerges and the life of man is "solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short"). A reader who does not believe that political authority is legitimate
will conclude that civil disobedience, and probably anarchy as well, is justified for all persons.
Consequently, for purposes of this argument we assume that the idea of political authority is
legitimate.
In addition to recognizing the concept of political authority, we also accept the general
duty to obey the law issued by a legitimate political authority. We may conclude that the
political obligation to obey law flows automatically from the political authority, or we may
find that it is independently justified. See, e.g., Sartorius, Political Authority and Political
Obligation, 67 VA. L. Rtv. 3 (1981) (treating as two distinct questions).
The final point, that our U.S. legal system represents a legitimate political authority, is
discussed in the text.
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system. As a result, rightly or wrongly many people tend to closely correlate
the ideal of the rule of law with the enactments and pronouncements of
our political systemA2
Because lawyers are involved intimately with the law and indeed swear
to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, the reasonable
assumption is that lawyers do accept the legitimacy of our legal system.
25
Our legal system, however, occasionally (and sometimes systemically) causes
or allows an injustice. Sometimes-often in painful circumstances-our
positive law deviates more than a de minimus amount from the ideal of
the rule of law. What is the proper response of the lawyer when the legal
system perpetuates an injustice?
As several commentators have noted, when a person engages in the
public, nonviolent breaking of law and submits to punishment willingly,
that person is demonstrating respect for the general concept of the rule of
law.26 In other words, by submitting oneself to punishment, the individual
is acknowledging that all persons should be subject to law.27 Consequently,
if the lawyer engages in civil disobedience and accepts any punishment that
may accrue, the lawyer is not denying the underlying validity of the rule
of law. Yet given that the lawyer in this instance simultaneously acts both
as an agent of the law and violator of the law, it seems too simplistic to
stop at this point. It is one thing to say that a general citizen can both
show respect for an institution and defy some of its dictates. It is more
troublesome, however, to assert that lawyers can legitimately uphold and
defy the law simultaneously.
C. Lawyers and the Rule of Law
Civil disobedience by definition requires persons to rebel against some-
thing. That "something" is an acknowledged legitimate political system that
24. Cf. T. TyLam, WHY PEoran OBEY THE LAW 4, 170-78 (1990) (if people "regard legal
authorities as more legitimate, they are less likely to break any laws, for they will believe that
they ought to follow all of them, regardless of the potential for punishment").
25. See supra note 17. When oppressed groups are legally precluded from having a
political voice in their system, such as civil disobedience against apartheid in South Africa, we
have significant questions about the underlying political legitimacy of the government. Many
protesters essentially challenge the legitimacy of the United States political system. If one does
not believe in the legitimacy of the United States political system, then there are far fewer
constraints on civil disobedience.
26. Lippman, Towards a Recognition of the Necessity Defense for Political Protesters,
48 WASH. & LEE L. RPv. 235, 242 (1991). Several writers in this symposium address the
theoretical and practical propriety of using the necessity defense as a "legal" defense to civil
disobedience. Even when a civilly disobedient defendant raises a necessity defense, the person
usually became a defendant by a public and nonviolent act.
27. If the individual is violating a law that the person deems unjust, then the individual
is engaging in direct civil disobedience by directly violating the law to be challenged. In direct
civil disobedience the individual is most sharply demonstrating the division between the ideal
of the rule of law and the practical product of the legal process. When the individual is
violating a law for the purpose of challenging a larger social or political issue, the individual
is engaging in indirect civil disobedience.
1991]
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the actor believes has erred. Despite the error, there nonetheless remains an
underlying structure-a foundation-of legitimate law-making. Those who
uphold that foundation of the political system are necessary and arguably
play a morally correct role. At the risk of being labeled naive, lawyers are
those who uphold the foundation of the legal system.2
Our legal system, like a corporation, cannot act except through individ-
ual agents. Lawyers are, along with judges and police officers, the most
common agents of the law. Much of the force of law comes not from
judicial opinions and legislatures, but from the lawyers' interpretation and
advice to clients about what the law means. 29 Consequently, by serving as
the conduit and translator of the law the lawyer is a major actor in
implementing both the law and the rule of law.
If the rule of law means, in ordinary language, that rules have some
moderate constraining force on the individual predilections of decision-
makers ("rule of law not men"),30 then the individual actors who are
charged with implementing the law must take seriously the goal of having
something beyond purely individual choice govern the implementation of
law.31 If these essential actors implement the law, we cannot help but look
to them for affirmation-or disaffirmation-of the legitimacy of our system.
The legitimacy of a legal system, in turn, is closely correlated to why people
obey the law.32 When these essential actors-lawyers and judges-disregard
law unequivocally, individual citizens cannot help but question the legitimacy
of our political system and the ideal of the rule of law. Adherence to the
rule of law then becomes a central definition of being a "law"yer.
The lawyer's special role in the law derives not just from the fact of
the lawyer's involvement with the law, but also from the nature of the
lawyer's involvement. Lawyers voluntarily enter into this agency relationship
with the law. Lawyers choose to study law, choose to take a bar exam and
become admitted to a bar, and choose to take an oath of office. Lawyers
then accept the benefits that flow from being a lawyer and take advantage
of the opportunities that accompany professional status. 3  Like a bond of
28. The "naive" label presumably would come from those who argue that the law is
strongly indeterminate. See generally Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 14-19 (1984). But see Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAin'. L. REv.
283 (1989) (arguing that law is only "moderately indeterminate").
29. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
30. See MODEL CODE EC 7-1 ("[in our government of laws and not of men, each
member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with
the law .. ."); supra note 27.
31. The civilly disobedient lawyer's decision to violate the law undoubtedly is based on
a well-grounded analysis of why the law is unjust. Consequently, the lawyer would argue that
the decision is not based on "purely individual choice," but rather is following the higher
principle of the rule of law. But because the lawyer cannot know how her or his decision to
break the law will be perceived, the lawyer is taking the rule of law seriously by fulfilling a
responsibility of caution. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 24.
33. See generally J. RAwrs, supra note 6, at 108-14, 342-43 (1971).
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sisterhood, lawyers take on the special responsibility to protect and care for
the rule of law. Because of the close identification our society makes between
the positive law and the rule of law, lawyers cannot defy the positive law
without raising at least the possibility of harming the rule of law.
Any legal system must maintain a core level of acceptance and legitimacy
to function effectively.3 Even so, in times of social turmoil our United
States legal system has been able to tolerate a certain amount of civil
disobedience. As proponents of civil disobedience aptly observe, our society
has benefitted as a result of that civil disobedience. No solid evidence exists
that a de minimis amount of civil disobedience, including disobedience by
lawyers, will cause permanent harm to the rule of law. Unfortunately,
however, no empirical studies indicate how much civil disobedience is
tolerable before causing harm to the concept of law.35 Logic and intuition
tell us that dangers exist if society, in effect, institutionalizes civil disobe-
dience, particularly when conducted by the law's own agents-the lawyers.36
We must recognize, however, that the lawyer's relationship to the law
may enhance the effectiveness of civil disobedience. Lawyers are systemically
part of the power structure, and the lawyer's intimate connection with the
law may make the lawyer an even more effective symbol of civil disobedi-
ence. 37 Consequently, perhaps more of the general public will notice the
underlying message of civil disobedience when "even lawyers" will rock the
boat and disobey the law. Yet the general public may have another reaction:
if even lawyers feel they are not bound by the law, why should we be
bound? St. Thomas Aquinas, the most noted spokesman on natural law,
recognized that even when a law is unjust by being contrary to human good
it may bind in conscience "in order to avoid scandal or disturbance.""
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 54-60, 89-96 (1961) (discussing acceptance of
rules).
35. See J. RAWLs, supra note 6, at 374 (stating that "I assume ... that there is a limit
on the extent to which civil disobedience can be engaged in without leading to a breakdown
in the respect for law and the constitution, thereby setting in motion consequences unfortunate
for all").
36. See generally Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001, 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that "[s]urely Rubin-one trained in the law-should know that if persons may, with
impunity disobey the law, it will not be long before there is no law lefttto obey"). See also
Levinson, supra note 12, at 511; Powell, supra note 10, at 205 (stating that one would expect
lawyers, as "guardians of our legal system," to "denounce civil disobedience as fundamentally
inconsistent with the rule of law"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 584 (1964) (Black, J.
dissenting) (stating that "it is not a far step from what to many seems the earnest, honest,
patriotic, kind-spirited multitude of today, to the fanatical, threatening, lawless mob of
tomorrow").
37. Justice Stone aptly stated a common criticism that most of the bar are "obsequious
servant[s] of business ... tainted ... with the morals and manners of the marketplace in its
most anti-social manifestations." Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. Rv.
1, 7 (1934).
38. ST. THoMAs AQUINAS, TarATisE ON LAW (SUMMA TaMOLOOsCA, Questions 90-97),
Question 96, Fourth Article (Gateway ed. 1987) (law contrary to Divine good, as opposed to
human good, "must nowise be observed"); see also Wright, Legal Obligation and the Natural
Law, 23 GA. L. REv. 997, 1009 (1989).
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What more compelling disturbance exists than the disturbance of an eroding
legal system? 39 This obligation to obey an unjust law "is not based on the
good of being law-abiding, but only on the desirability of not rendering
ineffective the just parts of the legal system." 4
We do not know whether onlookers will see the civilly disobedient
lawyer as upholding the rule of law or whether they will confuse the rule
of law with the positive law. The question becomes how to deal with this
uncertainty. Caution is the usual way in which we deal with uncertainty.
To minimize harm to the rule of law, philosophers argue that certain
preconditions, guidelines of caution, should be met before anyone engages
in civil disobedience.4 1 For example, John Rawls places three conditions on
engaging in civil disobedience. First, Rawls argues that civil disobedience
should be limited to "instances of substantial and clear injustice, and
preferably to those which obstruct the path to removing other injustices. ' 42
Second, before engaging in civil disobedience an individual should ascertain
that "normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in
good faith and ... they have failed." 43 In other words, "[s]ince civil
disobedience is a last resort, we should be sure that it is necessary. '44
Finally, "[i]n certain circumstances the natural duty of justice may require
a certain restraint" to avoid too many groups with equally sound cases
from simultaneously engaging in civil disobedience and thereby diminishing
the effectiveness of their disobedience. 41 In addition to these conditions,
every person electing to engage in civil disobedience must consider whether
it is "wise or prudent" in certain circumstances.4
Here again we turn to the concept of lawyer as agent of the law.
Whatever liberties a general citizen might undertake in applying these
conditions, certainly lawyers as agents charged with protecting and imple-
menting the law have a special duty to err on the side of caution in
39. See J. FN Ns, NATuRAL LAw Aim NATURAL RIHTS 361-62 (1980).
40. Id. at 361 (the "degree of compliance will vary according to the time, place, and
circumstance; in some limiting cases (e.g., of judges and other officials administering the law)
the morally required degree of compliance may amount to full or virtually full compliance,
just as if the law in question had been a just enactment") (emphasis in original).
41. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 371-74; Keeton, The Morality of Civil
Disobedience, 43 TEx. L. Rgv. 507 (1965) (arguing that understanding requirements of
responsible civil disobedience is necessary to enhance its effectiveness for constructive change).
42. J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 372 (stating that civil disobedience should be limited to
situations that appeal to public's conception of justice).
43. Id. at 373.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 373-74. Rawls states that "[t]he ideal solution from a theoretical point of view
calls for a cooperative political alliance of the minorities to regulate the overall level of
dissent." Id. at 374. In practice, he urges that minorities suffering from injustice develop a
"political understanding" by coordinating their actions so that while each has an opportunity
to exercise its right, the limits on the degree of civil disobedience are not exceeded." Id. at
375.
46. Id. at 376.
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evaluating each of these steps.4 7 Consequently, those who argue for civil
disobedience-and the lawyer's ability to counsel and engage in civil dis-
obedience-should have the burden of proving that such conduct is an
exception to the norm of obedience.41
Before engaging in civil disobedience a lawyer should take special care
to examine whether the law or policy being opposed produces a clear and
substantial injustice. Is the injustice far removed from the ideal of the rule
of law? Because of the lawyer's special knowledge of both the law in general
and the particular law at issue, a lawyer may have a broader basis than the
general citizen to make this assessment.
Similarly, lawyers also have a special obligation to pursue "legitimate"
means of redress. Any person who has pursued a controversial issue in
judicial or legislative forums knows the disparity between the myth and the
reality of American political and legal action. To pursue legal change
requires enormous amounts of time, money, and expertise. Because of their
special relationship to the law, lawyers have a greater expertise to pursue
legal and legislative change. Given that as individuals lawyers have only a
limited amount of time, energy, and expertise to give, there is a powerful
utilitarian basis for saying that lawyers' efforts should be directed at making
legal change for which others may lack the necessary expertise. Consider
the fair or proper allocation of activity when a natural disaster strikes. A
strong argument can be made that a doctor facing a natural disaster should
devote his or her energies to giving medical care rather than to working in
an office assisting in arranging the transport of supplies. Similarly, when
injustice occurs, the lawyer has a special duty to use his or her expertise to
correct that injustice.4 9
That a lawyer has a special duty to obey the law does not force the
lawyer into a position of blind adherence to law. Lawyers cannot ignore
unjust laws by pointing to the general legitimacy of the system. The very
reasons that bind a lawyer so strongly to the rule of law also impose on
the lawyer a duty to make the law just. Because of their special relationship
with the law, lawyers arguably have a special duty to respond not just to
active injustice but also to passive injustice-those instances in which public
officials and private citizens (including themselves) fail to prevent wrong-
doing or harm.50 Our legal system possesses, however, an ability to tolerate
47. See also Levinson, supra note 12, at 511; J. RAwLS, supra note 6, at 342-50, 376
(asserting that more favored members of society have clear political obligation as opposed to
political duty to uphold any just constitution).
48. See generally Levinson, supra note 12, at 510-11.
49. Charles Houston, civil rights leader and former dean of Howard Law School, provides
a powerful examle of this vision of a special obligation. Houston devoted himself to developing
a "cadre of lawyers trained in the art of social engineering" and "designed strategies
commensurate with the task." Hobbs, From The Shoulders of Houston: A Vision for Social
and Economic Justice, 32 How. L.J. 505, 512-13 (1989). See Cowen, The Lawyer's Role in
Civil Disobedience, 47 N.C.L. Ray. 587, 596-97 (1969).
50. J. SmmAR., THE FACES OF INzusca 5 (1990).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:139
a significant amount of "legal" dissent and significant-though imperfect- -
avenues of reform. Expansive interpretations of the First Amendment allow
for vigorous public debate. Consequently, a person-including a lawyer-
can take part in a public or mass protest without engaging in civil disobe-
dience. When individuals or groups-including lawyers-exercise constitu-
tionally protected rights, such as the right to assemble peacefully and protest,
they are using lawful means to attempt to persuade the larger community
to embrace the protesters' goals.-"
Similarly, the United States legal system makes room for the "test
case," in which individuals perform an act to create a controversy in order
to give the legal system an opportunity to change the offending law . 2 The
test case method allows an individual to mount a direct challenge to a law
by violating the law and bringing the dispute to court.5 3 Test case litigation
is possible in instances of "direct" civil disobedience, in which the individual
is challenging the very law being broken. 4 Additionally, test case litigation
requires that the individual have some good faith basis for believing that
his or her position is justified by the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.5 s
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct implicitly endorses the
rationale behind the test case technique of challenging the existing law when
it states that a lawyer "may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law."5 6
Similarly, both the Model Rules and ABA Model Code" of Professional
Responsibility provide that lawyers may make a good faitlh argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, again creating a
51. See Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1967).
See, e.g., Winn, A New Idea: Life Chains, Focus ON THE FAM. C EN, June 18, 1990, at 1
(describing how, without breaking laws, participants stood in line holding sign stating "Abortion
Kills Children").
52. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (reversing breach of peace
conviction from sit-in to protest segregation of public library; statute unconstitutional as
applied to petitioners); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (reversing conviction of
physician and Planned Parenthood director who gave contraceptive information to married
couples in violation of Connecticut law).
53. Many of the civil rights cases and challenges to birth control laws follow this model
in which the individual creates a bona fide dispute and tests it withinr the bounds of the law.
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (involving breach of peace statute). See
generally Allen, supra note 51, at 6-7 (discussing conflict between federal system of law and
political authority versus state legal system); Gibson, supra note 4, at 212 (discussing distinction
between test case and civil disobedience).
54. Indirect civil disobedience, in which the individual violates a valid law to bring to
the public attention a larger social policy or issue, will seldom, if ever, be the basis for a test
case.
55. The cumulative effect of these multiple ways to challenge laws creates significant
opportunity to appeal to the public sense of justice. In the words of Professor Francis A.
Allen, "frequently in the American system an appeal to conscience and morality is an appeal
to law." Allen, supra note 51, at 7; see also Cowen, supra note 49, at 589-93 (discussing test
case).
56. MODEL RuIEs Rule 1.2(d) & 3.1.
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legal outlet for challenging law and reflecting the fluidity of our legal
system.57 Because so many volatile issues have a constitutional basis for
challenge, "the range of moral issues that cannot be tied in good faith to
a constitutional provision is relatively narrow.""8
Identifying a "special obligation" to obey the law, however, does not
indicate that it is never right for a lawyer to break the law. Perhaps a
lawyer who feels compelled to commit an act of civil disobedience, but who
is uncertain what effect disobedience as a lawyer would have on the legal
system, may feel compelled to resign from the bar.5 9 Perhaps a lawyer as
individual would conclude that, even using the "extra caution" above, civil
disobedience was appropriate. Thus, in correspondence with the idea of
civil disobedience, the lawyer would willingly subject him or herself to the
punishment of the law. The next question to consider is whether the lawyer
should be subject to any additional professional sanction for engaging in
civil disobedience?
D. Professional Regulation and Civil Disobedience
How should the obligation to obey the law affect how lawyers regulate
themselves? Because only licensed attorneys may practice law, state bars
control who may be admitted to practice and what justifies expulsion from
the practice. 60 All jurisdictions have adopted a code or standard of ethics.
The two dominant models, the ABA Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility [Model Code] and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
[Model Rules], provide two ways to address the question of the lawyer's
relationship to the law.61 Both models contain broad ambiguities. Those
ambiguities, however, are both tolerable and appropriate. 62
57. MODEL RULEs Rule 3.1; MODEL CODE EC 7-22 ("a litigant or his lawyer may, in
good faith and within the framework of the law, take steps to test the correctness of a ruling
of a tribunal"); see also ABA Formal Opinion 314 (1965); In re Tamblyn, 298 Or. 620, 695
P.2d 902 (1985) (requiring no discipline against lawyer who advised client to disobey preliminary
injunction that Supreme Court held legally void).
58. Levinson, supra note 12, at 510 n.81.
59. Cf. Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics
Becoming Justices, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 1047, 1064 (1989) (quoting Justice Scalia's confirmation
hearing statement that he would recuse himself from a case if he could not separate his
personal moral feelings from his duties as servant of the law). Jurisdictions also require that
attorneys take an oath of office before being admitted to practice. That oath requires that the
attorney swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. "A lawyer who
is willing to violate a statute or a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility on the
belief that higher values predominate, may yet hesitate before violating the oath of office that
the lawyer took upon entering upon the practice of law. The oath was, after all, a voluntary
act, in a solemn setting purporting to bind the new lawyer in conscience." Levinson, supra
note 12, at 492-93.
60. See generally C. WorLsAm, supra note 1, at §2.1-.7.
61. The Model Code and Model Rules were drafted by the American Bar Association.
Like a uniform law, they have no force until adopted, with whatever amendments might be
made, by the individual jurisdiction. See generally C. WorLARM, supra note 1, at § 2.6.
62. Every jurisdiction requires that a lawyer meet some criteria of "character." Rhode,
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The Model Code prohibits a lawyer from engaging in "illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude" or engaging in "conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice."63 The ABA formal pronouncements under the
Model Code reject any distinction between professional and personal con-
duct, stating that a lawyer must comply with applicable rules at all times
whether or not the lawyer is acting in a professional capacity. 64 In contrast,
the Model Rules state that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" or to "engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 6s This language
reflects a conscious policy in the Model Rules to cover only offenses that
"indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice."66 Although
both statements are sufficiently vague to allow for a variety of interpreta-
tions, the Model Rules seem to narrow the range of possible illegal conduct
that would affect a lawyer's professional status.
Which vision, the full or part-time lawyer, is correct? Is an individual
a lawyer, and therefore charged with upholding the integrity of the rule of
law, only when doing lawyer-like things? Or, like a priest or a parent, do
lawyers hold their role all the time?
Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 493 (1985). Most jurisdictions
generally list some relevant characteristics, usually focusing on "qualities that demonstrate a
lack of good moral character." Brennan, Defining Moral Character and Fitness, 58 THE BAR
EXAMINER 24 (1989). The list of qualities, both positive and negative, varies with the jurisdiction.
"Criminal conviction is by far the most commonly reported reason for denying admission,
but very few, if any, offenses are so disabling that a person will be excluded from the bar in
every state because of the offense." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at § 15.3.2. The few opinions
to deal with the issue have concluded that not every intentional violation of law shows lack
of fitness to practice law. See Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 237, 421 P.2d 76, 85 (1966). Although bar admission information often is confi-
dential, one study indicated that only about 50 bar applicants a year are denied admission to
practice on character grounds. Rhode, supra, at 516. Denying admission requires a prediction,
which we tend to be hesitant to make, so that the concept of good moral character in practice
"quickly becomes meaningless, conceptual, and highly individualized." C. WoLmu", supra
note 1, at § 15.3.2; see also Rhode, supra; cf. Sciortino, A Rite of Passage, 58 THE BAR
EXAMINER 14, 15 (1989) (stating that it is "difficult to validate theory of the linkage" between
past behavior and future conduct; but that "it may be prudent for bar examiners to act as if
the hypothesis has not been disprove[d]"). Admission to the bar, then, gives us few insights
into what role breaking the law should play in professional discipline. Decisions whether to
discipline a practicing lawyer provide a better vehicle for discussion.
63. MODE. CODE DR 1-102(A)(3) & (A)(5).
64. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974)
(stating that lawyer should not engage in conduct that tends to lessen public confidence in
legal profession).
65. MODEL RULEs Rule 8.4 (b), (d). The preamble to the Model Rules, which is
aspirational rather than directive, states that "[a] lawyer's conduct should conform to the
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business
and personal affairs." MODEL RuLEs, preamble.
66. MODEL RuLEs Rule 8.4 comment 1 (stating that "[a]lthough a lawyer is personally
answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for
offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice").
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As a practical matter one cannot draw sharp lines between the lawyer
and personal self.67 Lawyers struggle constantly with the question of how
to reconcile personal beliefs with their role in the legal system. 61 One cannot
humanly shed all personal perspectives when acting as a lawyer, even when
one might have a responsibility to minimize them. 69 Certainly some acts
performed in the privacy of one's home and late in the evening might spill
over to one's role as a lawyer. For example, most would question the fitness
of a lawyer to practice law if that lawyer had sought to embezzle funds,
even if the embezzlement concerned strictly personal business dealings. That
act shows a defiance of the basic rules of how to allocate rights and
responsibilities in our society.
We can envision other contexts in which there is no clearly identifiable
person whose rights have been violated, but rather the amorphous concept
of the public interest. When Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry was
sentenced to six months in prison for a first-time misdemeanor drug offense,
some found the sentence, as "compared to other sentences of people equally
situated, to be surprisingly harsh."17 0 The judge candidly stated that "[o]f
greatest significance to me in sentencing this defendant is the high public
office he has at all relevant times occupied ... [B]ecause of the defendant's
unique position, he's not an ordinary misdemeanant.17 1 As Mayor, Marion
Barry had a special duty to obey the law and that duty extended even into
"private" time.
Consequently, a lawyer does not avoid the problem of special respon-
sibility simply by asserting publicly that the act of civil disobedience is being
done as a citizen, not a lawyer. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the
formal bar mechanism should sanction all attorneys who engage in civil
disobedience. The bar as a regulator of conduct suffers from serious
limitations. The lawyer's system of self-regulation struggles under mixed
motives-or at least a strong perception of mixed motives. One reason
lawyers work to develop codes is altruistic: they seek to develop standards
to educate both lawyers and the public, to reinforce notions of right and
wrong, and to provide a method of deterring misconduct.7 2 Those with a
more jaundiced view see the system of self-regulation as motivated by
economic and class self-interest.7 3
67. Trying to sharply distinguish between the lawyer and person is like trying to make
sharp, clear distinctions between public and private law. See generally A Symposium: The
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 1289 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to Professor Green-
awalt, 9 J. L. & Religion (1991) (forthcoming); Levinson, supra note 12.
69. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
70. Gellman, Barry's 'High Public Office' Led Judge to Stronger Sentence, Wash. Post,
Oct. 27, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
71. Id.
72. See C. WoLaRAm, supra note 1, at § 2.6.1 (explaining possible reasons why group
might agree on code of member conduct); Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability
of Lawyers, 66 CAin'. L. Rav. 669, 682 (1978) (stating three limitations on enforcing
professional standards that restrict lawyers from counseling civil disobedients).
73. See C. WoixRAM, supra note 1, at § 2.6.1 (explaining possible motivation of
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Even assuming that the altruistic goals dominate, the codes evidence
the struggle to identify which altruistic goal should dominate. Should the
codes serve primarily to educate lawyers, reinforce their notions of right
and wrong, or deter the most harmful conduct? The codes have evolved
from the 1908 "Canons of Professional Ethics," which were largely aspi-
rational, to the 1969 "Model Code of Professional Responsibility," which
contained a blend of aspirational and directive statements, to the 1983
"Model Rules of Professional Conduct," which contain only a limited
number of aspirational statements. This evolution from "ethics" to "re-
sponsibility" to "rules of conduct" indicates that the bars have function-
ally-and perhaps properly-recognized the inherent limits of trying to use
aspirational goals rather than concrete standards. These self-developed stan-
dards, which require group approval and, consequently, a certain measure
of consensus, inevitably focus on the lowest common denominator.7 4 Even
assuming that lawyers would all agree that they should exercise special
caution before engaging in civil disobedience, lawyers inevitably will disagree
about what constitutes special caution. The resolution of that issue is
grounded in how much one believes our legal system deviates from the
norm of perfect justice, how much one weighs the harm caused by the
injustice, and other variables not subject to even quasi-objective proof. As
a system based on consensus, lawyer regulation is particularly ill-suited to
be a directive basis for setting standards of caution. 75
Lawyer self-regulation can pick up the most egregious cases of repeated
defiant acts, and the current standards are sufficient to capture those
instances. For example, one state bar committee suggested that a single act
of civil disobedience did not call into question an attorney's fitness to
practice law, but concluded "that frequent and/or continual misdemeanor
convictions of this nature may result in more serious professional conse-
quences." 76
professional code drafters); Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L.
Rev. 639 (1981); DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good Order: An Argument for Allowing Lawyers
To Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L. Rev. 109, 135 (1982) (stating that elite of bar
often undertake actions to punish lawyers who exercise their right to challenge authority);
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L.
Rav. 689 (1981) (discussing concerns of codification and wisdom of placing codification under
bar control).
74. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at § 2.6.1 (stating that professional code by necessity
can regulate only narrow range between marginally enforceable rules and insubstantial rules).
75. Id. (stating that once a number of lawyers defy a code rule, other lawyers will ignore
the rule based on competitive pressures and sense of unfairness); Luban, Calming the Hearse
Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. Rev. 451, 460-61
(1981) (ethics and regulation do not coincide). Any issues in which deeply felt views of what
.1
is right or wrong arise are inevitably inappropriate for self-regulation. C. WoUaRAM, supra
note 1, at § 2.6.1. If a critical mass of lawyers disagree with whether the lawyer is disqualified
from practicing law because of engaging in civil disobedience, then they will act to keep the
bars from either expressly or impliedly developing that standard. Id. If a critical mass of
lawyers disagree with a standard, the rule will probably be ignored. Id.
76. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1185, Virginia Lawyer Register, October 1989, at
14, col. 1.
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The standard of special caution, then, is one that each lawyer should
assume individually. The law is not well suited to command all aspects of
moral behavior. 7 Given that law and morality do not always dictate the
same behavior and given the possible existence of unjust laws within a valid
legal system, individual lawyers must define some standards for themselves.
II. COUNSELING THE CLIENT: A WORKING CONCEPT OF LAWYER
Even when lawyers are not breaking the law themselves, they are likely
to have some relationship with nonlawyers who engage in civil disobedience.
Many acts of civil disobedience are part of a broad-based attack on an
unjust law or situation. The "war" against the injustice will have many
fronts, both legal and illegal. For example, the civil rights movement
proceeded not only through lawsuits and political action, but also through
acts of civil disobedience used to highlight and reinforce the judicial and
legislative fronts.7 8 Lawyers obviously will be integrally involved in judicial
and legislative battles. (As argued above, that is also where the lawyers'
energies ought to be directed.) Many individuals contemplating civil dis-
obedience may turn for legal advice to the same lawyers who are pursuing
the social goal through traditional means. Even when a person anticipating
civil disobedience is not part of a larger social movement, the individual
contemplating a known violation of the law likely will seek the advice and
counsel of an attorney, if only to arrange to have counsel available after
arrest.
We are not likely to learn what passes in those conferences because of
the attorney-client privilege.7 9 We nonetheless can develop a model of what
ought to happen. In order to answer this seemingly simple question of how
a lawyer should counsel a civilly disobedient client, we need to develop a
working model-of counseling. The idea of "counseling" can be used in the
layperson's sense that one "tells" another what to do. In its richer and
broader sense, however, "counseling" envisions a more complex process.
It is axiomatic that a client is an autonomous individual whose views
on the major issues involved in the representation are to be respected. The
attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship in which the client is
77. See ST. T. AQuiNAS, supra note 38, at 95 (stating that human law does not bind
man in conscience).
78. See Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Historical and Theo-
retical Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 77 (1991) (stating that civil disobedience activities
provided unity and focus to civil rights movement and educated those not witnessing movement
first hand).
79. See generally McCoaIcK ON EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
(discussing client privilege and communications between client and lawyer); MODEL CODE DR
4-101 (1990) (stating that liwyer shall not reveal confidences or secrets except under certain
circumstances); MODEL RutLs Rule 1.6 (1990) (stating that lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation except under limited circumstances). See also DiSalvo, supra note
73, at 134 (stating that no reported cases exist in which bar associations have disciplined
lawyers for counseling civil disobedients).
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the principal.8 0 As the person who has the legal problem and who will
suffer any legal consequences, the client's wishes and views must be re-
spected. Consequently, legal scholars and codes regulating lawyer conduct
recognize that the client is entitled to make all significant decisions in the
legal representation.8 1 Wherever we draw the dividing line between the
lawyer's and the client's responsibilities, we can confidently state that the
decision whether or not to engage in an act of civil disobedience is uniquely
a personal decision solely for the client. Not only is the client's decision
uniquely personal, but the lawyer's role in implementing that decision usually
is limited to giving the client information sufficient to allow the client to
make the difficult choice of whether to break the law or not. Consequently,
the lawyer as counselor does not play an instrumental role in the act of
civil disobedience. 2 This personal decision is not to be lightly made by any
concerned citizen and requires thoughtful introspection. A lawyer would no
more "tell" a client to engage in civil disobedience than a lawyer would
"tell" a client to get a divorce. Consequently, a lawyer may not "counsel"
in the narrow sense of the word.
This client-centered vision of counseling, however, does not require that
the lawyer become simply a passive recipient of the client's goals.83 Although
a lawyer may not "tell" a client to engage in civil disobedience, the lawyer
possessing any respect for the client's autonomy must consider what infor-
mation should be given the client concerning civil disobedience. The client
is entitled not merely to make his or her own decisions, but to make an
"informed" decision.A4 To make an informed decision requires that the
80. See C. WoamAm, supra note 1, at § 4.2 (explaining that law of agency binds clients
to acts of their lawyers).
81. See, e.g., D. BiwDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELNG: A CIENCT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1977); Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REv.
1078 (1979) (discussing relation between lawyer and client); Wasserstrom, supra note 20
(discussing moral objection to relationship between attorney and client because lawyer tends
to dominate relationship and treat clients inpersonally and paternalistically).
82. See Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct, 35 U. MiAw L. REv. 669, 671 (1981) (compares least instrumental act of providing
definitions of the limits of the law with providing "the means without which the client could
not achieve the illicit purpose").
83. See C. WoliFRAm, supra note 1, at § 13.2.1 (describing counseling and client-lawyer
relationship). Charles Wolfram refers to the lawyer as "non-preemptive counselor," which
means that "[t]he lawyer neither attempts to preempt important areas of client autonomy nor
is willing to accede to unreasonable client demands for sacrifices of the lawyer's personal or
professional autonomy in performing legal services." Id.
84. This obligation to help the client make an informed decision appears in the Model
Code and the Model Rules. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 5-105(C) (stating that client can
consent to lawyer representing multiple clients after full disclosure of possible effect of such
representation on exercise of lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of each
client); MODEL CODE EC 7-8 (stating that lawyer should exert best efforts to insure that
decisions of client are made only after client has been informed of relevant considerations);
MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.2(a) (stating that lawyer shall abide by client's decisions concerning
objectives of representation and consult with client as to means by which objectives of
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE LA WYER
client know the pros and cons of various anticipated actions. 5 Certainly
when a client contemplates breaking the law, the client must be aware of
the consequences of the legal violation. (The mere explanation of the
consequences of engaging in illegal conduct might affect significantly the
client's decision. 6) The client also needs to consider the political and social
consequences of engaging in civil disobedience. The lawyer can be very
helpful in assisting the client to consider thoroughly all the positive and
negative consequences of his or her acts.
The legal consequences of civil disobedience are more complex than
simply noting the punishment for the anticipated legal violation. A fully
informed client is entitled to know that our legal system reflects an often
contradictory attitude toward violations of the law that do not fall tidily
into the category of common criminality. For example, many jurisdictions
recognize a necessity defense to criminal charges.87 The necessity defense
envisions that an individual may be justified in violating the law in order
to avoid a greater harm. 8 (The necessity defense again exemplifies the
pockets of flexibility built into our seemingly rigid legal system by providing
another vehicle by which our legal system recognizes that "[t]he law ought
to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser ones." '8 9)
Although a necessity defense is rarely allowed for "political" protests, it
nonetheless remains a theoretical possibility.9 If the client is entitled to
representation shall be pursued); MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.4(b) (stating that lawyer shall explain
matter to extent reasonably necessary to permit client to make informed decisions regarding
representation); MODEL RuLEs, preamble at "Terminology" (stating that "consult or "consul-
tation" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit client to
appreciate significance of matter in question).
85. See Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 307
(1980) (discussing necessity of informed consent between attorney and client); Spiegel, Law-
yering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 41 (1979) (discussing informed consent between attorney and client).
86. This full counseling is an important way in which lawyers tend to dissuade clients
from engaging in illegal acts not tied to civil disobedience. Many lawyers have dissuaded clients
from engaging in unlawful acts, such as shading the truth or lying in depositions or in court,
by pointing out the practical difficulties and dangers raised by that conduct.
87. See Apel, Operation Rescue and the Necessity Defense: Beginning a Feminist Decon-
struction, 48 WAsH. & LE L. Ray. 41 (1990) (describing instances when individuals raise
necessity defense); Lambek, Necessity and International Law: Arguments for the Legality of
Civil Disobedience, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 472 (1987) (discussing that courts should permit
peace activists to assert necessity defense); Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil
Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 79 (1989) (discussing relationship between necessity
defense and indirect civil disobedience); Note, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of
Necessity, 54 U. Cm. L. Ray. 1070 (1987) (discussing Illinois necessity defense and lack of
availability in political protest cases).
88. See Apel, supra note 87, at 42 (stating that under certain circumstances individual
may be justified in breaking law to prevent greater harm).
89. Lambek, supra note 87, at 476; see also Apel, supra note 87, at 67 (stating that
necessity defense is not set of rules to be applied in mechanistic fashion).
90. Lippman, Towards a Recognition of the Necessity Defense for Political Protesters,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 235 (1991) (stating that courts should accept defense in certain
circumstances).
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information about the legal consequences of his or her act, then the client
is entitled to know about the necessity defense and the possibility-perhaps
weak in many jurisdictions-to urge its modification or expansion. Similarly,
some jurisdictions expressly or impliedly allow for "jury nullification" in
which a jury declines to apply a facially valid law to particular facts.91 A
fully informed client also should recognize that police may choose to ignore
the criminal violation, which avoids the legal consequences of civil disobe-
dience, but may also undermine its effectiveness. 92
Consequently, to "counsel" a client who is considering whether to
engage in civil disobedience does not mean the words "civil disobedience"
may never be uttered in a lawyer's office.93 In order to assist the client in
making an informed decision, the lawyer must conduct a meaningful dia-
logue with the client involving legal, social, moral, and political factors. 94
To fulfill his or her role, a lawyer must "counsel" the client when counseling
is used in its richest sense. A lawyer who respects the client's autonomy
also will recognize that in some cases the lawyer holds a position of power
and persuasiveness that can interfere with the client's autonomy.93 Conse-
quently, even if the lawyer personally is persuaded that the client would do
the right thing by engaging in civil disobedience, the lawyer must be careful
not to pressure the client.
91. See generally Scheflin & Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullifi-
cation, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 165 (1991); HoRowrrz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of
Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & Hum.
BEHAv. 439 (1988) (discussing evaluation of jury nullification statistics received from research);
Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAw & CoNr mp.
PROBS. 51 (1980) (discussing that nullification instruction lets jury operate in more honest and
just fashion).
92. See, e.g., Valentine, D.C. Protesters Chilled, Thwarted by No Arrests, Wash. Post,
Jan. 29, 1991, at A16, col. 1 ("[t]o hear anti-war demonstrators tell it, it's getting harder to
be arrested in this town, even when you want to be").
93. See DiSalvo, supra note 73, at 110 (stating that it is no longer honest for profession
to refuse to recognize importance of civil disobedience in creating change in law and public
policy). Consequently, I disagree that "[t]he profession's official view of civil disobedience
and the lawyer's role in it, embodied in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, is
that would-be civil disobedients have no place in the office of the lawyer qua counselor." Id.
94. See id. at 142-49 (discussing how to counsel civil disobedients). "[A lawyer] can
attempt to help the disobedient clarify and integrate his belief structure by asking searching
questions founded in the beliefs already expressed by the disobedient. By more probing he can
then help the disobedient apply this belief structure to the options available." Id. at 147.
95. See Lehman, supra note 81, at 1082 (stating that people consider lawyers to be
worthy advisors and take seriously what they have to say).
The lawyer obviously knows more about the intricacies of law than the average
citizen. The client must believe that the lawyer is more knowledgeable on the subject,
else she would not have sought the lawyer's advice. With this assumed knowledge
often comes a certain amount of authority in the eyes of the client, and with
authority comes persuasiveness. Thus the lawyer should be cautious in distinguishing
between making the client aware of her options and convincing the client to do
something she might not ordinarily do.
L. Goodman, The Lawyer and QMl Disobedience (undergraduate Legal Ethics paper on file
with J. McMorrow).
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This vision of full counseling is not inconsistent with the Model Code
or the Model Rules. The Model Code and Model Rules do not expressly
address the issue of civil disobedience. Although the language of both the
Model Code and Model Rules seems to create an absolute line between
legal and illegal acts, both reveal that identifying this dividing line is not
always easy.9 The Model Code states that the lawyer should not "[c]ounsel
or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent."97 By linking "counsel" and "assist," this language seems to
use counseling in its narrow sense of telling and thereby encouraging. 98 This
language also prohibits the lawyer only from counseling or assisting; it does
not require the lawyer to counsel the client not to engage in illegal activity.9
Other provisions of the Model Code show a particular ambivalence and
ambiguity about the meaning of counseling and possible illegal acts. Ethical
Consideration 7-5 provides that "[a lawyer] may continue in the represen-
tation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of
conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby
knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous
legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit
criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid
punishment therefor."'1° The use of the "and" emphasizes the concept of
counseling surreptitious violations.' 0'
The Model Rules send an even stronger message that discussing and
"counseling" (used in its broadest sense) a client to engage in civil dis-
obedience is not inappropriate. °2 Model Rule 1.2(d) states that "[a] lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law."' 03 The last clause
"recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or
96. See generally Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. Rav. 468 (1990)
(arguing against notion that bounds of the law are objective, consistent, and legitimate
restrictions on zealous advocacy). But see DiSalvo, supra note 73, at 109-10 (describing official
view of profession as strict division between civil disobedience and lawyers' role in it).
97. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(7).
98. Cf. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine,
73 CAir. L. REv. 323, 343 (1985) (discussing what constitutes assistance).
99. Cf. C. Wor.FI.1, supra note 1, at § 13.3.8 (stating that laws that are widely ignored
and seldom or never enforced are problematic for lawyers counseling civil disobedients). "[O]n
the whole, lawyers serve the interests of society better if they urge upon clients the desirability
of complying with all valid laws, no matter how widely violated by others they may be." Id.
100. MODEL CODE EC 7-5 (emphasis added).
101. See ABA Commu. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, Formal Op. 281 (1952) (stating that there
is sharp distinction between advising what can lawfully be done and advising how unlawful
acts can be done to avoid conviction); ABA Com. ON PROFEssioNAL ETmcs, Formal Op. 155
(1936) (lawyer subject to discipline for failure to disclose whereabouts of fugitive client).
102. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDucT § 1.3.
103. MODEL Rutss Rule 1.2(d) (emphasis added).
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regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the
statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental
authorities." 104 This provision expressly provides for violations to create a
test case.
The comments accompanying Model Rule 1.2 also emphasize the full
range of information to which the client is entitled. A lawyer has a duty
to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences of the client's acts.
The fact that the client uses the advice to commit an illegal act "does not,
of itself, make a lawyer a party to the course of action. However, a lawyer
may not knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. There
is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of
questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or
fraud might be committed with impunity. 105
The Model Code and Model Rules, then, try to walk a delicate line by
allowing full conversation between lawyer and client, but not allowing the
lawyer to be involved in surreptitious violations of the law. Undoubtedly
the Model Code and Model Rules can be read to allow state bar associations
to sanction attorneys who counsel clients to engage in civil disobedience.
Some scholars argue that the latent ambiguity of the Model Code and
Model Rules places a "chilling effect" on counseling clients who engage in
civil disobedience.10 6 To credit this argument the lawyer must first fear that
outsiders will pierce the attorney-client relationship and learn of the attorney-
client conversations. In addition, this argument places a high value on the
Model Code and Model Rules. I doubt that a lawyer who reflects consci-
entiously on this problem will be dissuaded from counseling clients who
engage in civil disobedience. The Model Code and Model Rules, like most
efforts to regulate conduct, are replete with ambiguities. Lawyers themselves
are masters in recognizing and accommodating ambiguity.1°7 Moreover,
moral considerations, including a strong belief in justice and client auton-
omy, are likely to sway lawyers much more than the ambiguity of the
Model Code and Model Rules. I am aware of no cases in which a lawyer
has been sanctioned for counseling a client to engage in civil disobedience.
Consequently, only the most timid of lawyers is likely to be chilled, and
these timid lawyers are likely to stay miles away from any controversial
client. Some commentators also fear that the bar will use political consid-
104. MODEL RULEs Rule 1.2 comment.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See DiSalvo, supra note 73, at 135-36 (arguing that penalty for violating DR 7-
102(A)(2), even though chance of discovery is small, effectively prevents lawyers from counseling
civil disobedients); Note, The Disciplinary Dilemma Confronting Attorneys Seeking to Counsel
Civil Disobedients, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 715, 730 (1985) (stating that language of DR 7-102(A)(2)
allows room for disciplining attorneys who encourage or advise client to engage in civil
disobedience).
107. See Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 470, 483 (1990) (when
client's aim is novel or controversial, "the goal of achieving the client's objectives is destined
to push the lawyer toward discovering gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the relevant legal
materials").
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erations and ambiguities in the Model Code or Model Rules to aggressively
pursue lawyers who counsel their clients to engage in civil disobedience.
The possibility of illegitimate political considerations, however, is inherent
in the human condition of self-regulation.
The reality of counseling and the duty to respect the client's autonomy
shape the nature of any counseling. Civil disobedience is a serious, personal
choice because the client will suffer negative legal consequences from en-
gaging in civil disobedience. The lawyer cannot tell the client how to make
that serious personal choice. Consequently, the lawyer can never "advise"
the client to engage in civil disobedience. The lawyer can, however, affirm
the client's decision by stating that in light of the client's goals, civil
disobedience indeed may be the only way to achieve those goals. Because
of the complex conversation that lawyer and client will have, persuading a
client to engage in civil disobedience against the client's inclinations is
unlikely to happen.
The more troublesome counseling question is whether the lawyer may
or must raise the possibility of civil disobedience. Perhaps the client's goals
would justify civil disobedience as one possible alternative. Political reality
confirms that in some situations civil disobedience has been extremely
effective. 108 If one goal of counseling is to allow the client to come to
morally correct decisions, then it is not wrong to give the client information
about the possibility of civil disobedience. 109
Despite the lawyer's duty to provide information to the client, it is
troubling to consider that information provided by the lawyer may instill
the idea of civil disobedience in the client's mind." 0 This question is similar
to the question whether juries should be told that they have the power to
ignore the law."' Only a handful of jurisdictions inform the jury that it
has the power to disregard the law. The rest balance the precarious tension
between the rule of law and positive law by not expressly telling the jury
of its potential power. Presumably if the law is sufficiently unjust, then the
jury's innate desire to do the right thing will give rise to the recognition
that perhaps they should decline to apply the law.
Whatever the parallels between jury nullification and civil disobedience,
civil disobedience has an additional significant factor. With jury nullification
the jury is the representative of the state. The jury is meting out the
punishment. With civil disobedience the individual actor is breaking the law
of the state and will be the recipient of any punishment. This personalizes
the question to an even greater extent. It involves the individual's most
fundamental beliefs about the relationship between the individual and the
108. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
109. See MODEL Rus.as Rule 1.2(d) comment (implying that what client does with raw
information is not lawyer's responsibility).
110. Drinan, Changing Role of the Lawyer in an Era of Non-Violent Action, I LAW IN
TRAxsrnoN Q. 123, 125-26 (1964) (stating that lawyer may not only be justified, but also
morally compelled to advise clients to disobey laws they regard as offensive).
111. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing jury nullification).
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state. The lawyer has a delicate role to play because the lawyer's superior
position of power may unduly influence the client. Even telling the client
about the option of civil disobedience implies that engaging in disobedience
is a co-equal option with all others. That it is generated from the lawyer
might give civil disobedience an additional imprimatur, despite disclaimers.
Affirmatively telling the client about the option of civil disobedience
also reaches to the heart of the lawyer's relationship to the law. Requiring
a lawyer to raise the possibility of civil disobedience would be like compelling
a doctor who personally is opposed to abortion to tell a patient about the
possibility of an illegal late-term abortion. It may be an option. It may be
the right thing to do in the eyes of many. But it nonetheless reaches very
deeply into the personal belief structure of the doctor (that late-term abortion
is wrong) which has been affirmed by the state (that late-term abortion is
illegal). Once the state has affirmed a well-considered value judgment (e.g.,
one should obey the law), then I see no moral basis to compel the lawyer
to raise the question of civil disobedience.
At the same time, the complex conversation that occurs between lawyer
and client makes me hesitate to say that a lawyer should never raise the
possibility of civil disobedience. Recognizing the potential for unduly, influ-
encing the client, recognizing the inherently personal nature of the decision,
and recognizing the importance of the idea of the rule of law, the lawyer
certainly should reflect very carefully before ever independently raising the
topic with the client. But if the client appears to be strongly committed to
seeking all available means to remedy the injustice, the lawyer may properly
raise civil disobedience as one social response to the injustice. (These
instances in which civil disobedience has not already occurred to the client
will obviously be rare.) Although this solution will not satisfy those who
wish clear lines and firm guidance, we have all lived long enough to know
that sometimes nice, tidy lines are not available.
CONCLUSION
As essential agents of our legal system, lawyers have a special obligation
to exercise special caution before engaging in civil disobedience. Because of
the limitation of the concept of self-regulation, this standard appropriately
is not incorporated into narrow "rules" of conduct, but should be part of
the individual lawyer's consideration when evaluating an unjust law.
When counseling a client the primary focus is no longer on the lawyer
and his or her special relationship with the law. Rather, the primary focus
is on assisting the client to make a fully informed decision. The lawyer
cannot "tell" a client to engage in civil disobedience because that is a
uniquely personal decision and because to do so would violate the lawyer's
duty to respect the decision-making authority of the client. To evaluate the
legal consequences of engaging in civil disobedience, however, the lawyer
will likely have to engage in a wide-ranging discussion about the necessity
defense and jury nullification-both of which are "legal" ways of curing
"illegality." Because of the reality of the complex conversation, placing
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any practical limitations on the lawyer as counselor is inherently problematic.
We can only urge the lawyer to respect the idea of the rule of law, to
respect the inherently personal nature of the decision for the client, and to
respect the client's autonomy.

